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INTRODUCTION 
 This is in response to the invitation from U.S. District Court Judge 
Victor Marrero and the Cardozo Law Review to offer perspectives on 
Judge Marrero’s Article, The Costs of Rules, the Rule of Costs.1 
 Judge Marrero’s Article is no ordinary Law Review Article. To 
begin with, it is ninety pages in length, written with passion and 
intensity. Its title targets practicing lawyers, but its content, upon close 
examination, challenges all parts of the legal profession. The problems 
involve rising costs and resulting abuses caused by expansive discovery 
and expensive motion practice, supported by and embedded in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and modern-day law practice. The 
problems discussed, however, are not simply those of practicing lawyers 
engaged in civil justice litigation. Courts have their responsibilities, too, 
since judges can make significant differences in dealing with the 
problems raised, and many do, through the exercise of their case 
management authority and judicial powers. In a very real sense, the 
challenges presented by the civil litigation costs and abuses identified by 
Judge Marrero need to be addressed by the entire legal profession. 
 Judge Marrero, a recent recipient of the Federal Bar Council’s 
Emory Buckner Award for Outstanding Public Service, has given much 
of his life to public service in a variety of roles.2 Through the lens of a 
thoughtful and able jurist, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs takes a 
hard look at the civil justice system. Thankfully, Judge Marrero’s 
concerns and alarms are being taken seriously by his colleagues on the 
bench and by the organized bar of New York. This special issue of the 
 
 1 Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599 (2016) 
 2 Judge Marrero served in many government positions before joining the bench of the 
Southern District in 1999. Some of these roles include serving as Undersecretary of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development; as U.S. Ambassador on the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations; as Chairman of the New York City Planning 
Commission; as Commissioner and Vice Chairman of the New York State Housing Finance 
Agency; as Chair of the New York State Chief Judge’s Committee to Improve the Availability of 
Legal Services; and as Counsel to the Governor of New York State and Comptroller of New 
York City. While in private law practice, he co-founded the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and 
Education Fund and served on boards and committees of the New York Public Library, the 
State University of New York, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See 
Marrero, Victor, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/marrero-victor 
[https://perma.cc/55JK-AX7W] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018); Hon. Victor Marrero, PRACTISING L. 
INST., https://www.pli.edu/Content/Faculty/Hon_Victor_Marrero/_/N-4oZ1z136ui?ID=
PE464456 [https://perma.cc/Q562-X8FR] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
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Cardozo Law Review, as well as the 2016 Issue where the Article 
appeared, speaks well of current law students wanting to see the 
challenges addressed. Thomas Jefferson once noted, “I hold it that a 
little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the 
political world as storms in the physical. . . . It is a med[icine] necessary 
for the sound health of government.”3 Judge Marrero, who a long time 
ago stirred such a revolution by calling for mandatory pro bono lawyers 
in New York State, may well have ignited another such revolution. The 
recommendations of that earlier Committee stirred the legal profession 
and law schools to lift their commitment to helping those in need of 
legal services who were unable to afford counsel.4 
 Upon receiving Judge Marrero’s request, I asked how I qualified to 
comment on his study’s treatment of pleadings, discovery, and motions 
in modern day law practice and the remedies he proposed. My initial 
hesitation was due to the fact that, for the last thirty-six years, I have 
been in academia as a law school dean and then a professor in the 
classroom, preceded a long time ago by the active practice of law as an 
associate and partner in a New York firm. Throughout all these years, 
however, I have been active in the work of the organized bar and have 
responded to requests to serve as a neutral in the resolution of conflicts 
in alternative dispute resolution (ADR). I have formed a view from my 
total life experiences that judges can make a major difference in 
addressing the problems described by Judge Marrero and that the world 
of ADR, especially that of mediation, offers models and remedies 
worthy of consideration. 
 I set forth in Part I a summary of Judge Marrero’s Article. Part II 
contains commentaries and responses by me concerning individual 
practices of judges under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
comments of others I surveyed, possible ADR remedies that are 
available, and the potential that inheres in collaborations by courts with 
the organized bar and the many law schools with experienced teachers, 
scholars, and educated and trained students in the field of ADR. I 
conclude with gratitude to Judge Marrero for sharing his insights on 
modern day civil justice and inspiring me and others to reflect on the 
civil justice system. 
 
 3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0095 [https://perma.cc/VB7N-4YA4]. 
 4 VICTOR MARRERO, COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES: 
FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Apr. 1990), reprinted in 19 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 756 (1991). 
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I.     OVERVIEW: THE COST OF RULES, THE RULE OF COSTS 
A.     Introduction 
 Judge Marrero begins his Article with reference to 1938, when the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules) became effective. 
He points to Rule 1 as the mantra for a newly organized federal judicial 
system intended to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding”5 and juxtaposes those 
aims with the reality of the previous unworkable system. He notes that 
the Federal Rules were intended to promote efficiency through the 
creation of a more fulsome factual record that would focus pretrial work 
on the disputed areas, make the strengths and weaknesses of each case 
more evident to both parties, and avoid certain evidentiary disputes. 
The Federal Rules were also intended to limit unfair ambushes and 
promote general cooperation.6 
 Judge Marrero posits that the original intent of the Federal Rules is 
not being realized in modern practice. He cites to surveys in which 
practicing attorneys come out against the expansive rules of discovery as 
too costly,7 and he identifies attorneys’ abuse of these rules as a major 
reason for the cost.8 He further notes that these costs are not limited to 
the parties in individual disputes. The excessive discovery and motion 
practice “exacts a high economic and social price which must be borne 
by everyone who relies on the justice system to protect and promote 
vital interests as well as individual and collective values.”9 
 Having first identified the problem of costs, Judge Marrero then 
seeks to identify causes other than the discovery rules. The issues 
identified include the Federal Rules themselves, the courts, and the new 
data-gathering practices that have significantly increased the amount of 
information available. But, the one issue that Judge Marrero identifies as 
the root of the problem is the “professional styles and actions of lawyers 
themselves.”10 
B.     The Legal Market and Law Firm Culture: Why Vexatious 
Litigation Exists 
 Judge Marrero goes into detail about how the changes that 
occurred in the size and structure of law firms in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 6 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1602. 
 7 Id. at 1603. 
 8 Id. at 1606. 
 9 Id. at 1606–07. 
 10 Id. at 1609. 
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created a need to emphasize litigation as the primary fee generator at 
large law firms.11 He attributes this shift from corporate work to 
litigation to the creation of larger, more sophisticated in-house teams 
that were able to accomplish many tasks traditionally left to law firms. 
The growth of in-house counsel resulted in a loss of some corporate 
work, and the remaining work tended to be discrete or highly 
specialized by nature. As projects became more interchangeable, law 
firms experienced increased scrutiny from current clients and increased 
competition for new business among law firms. This increased pressure 
crafted a law firm culture that emphasizes extreme competitiveness.12 
The Article then turns to the increased volume of litigation that has 
served firms’ bottom lines even with the loss of a substantial amount of 
corporate work to in-house teams. It emphasizes, however, “litigation 
abuse may function as a boon to the bottom line, a financial engine 
working to sustain a growing share of the legal profession’s 
profitability.”13 
 After noting the potential of law firms to increase their billings 
through over-litigating, Judge Marrero begins a discussion of how the 
prices at the top of the market and the “longer delays of court 
proceedings involving wealthy litigants can hinder justice at the bottom 
of the economic scale.”14 He notes that the complexity of disputes 
between wealthy parties that command the attention of the most adept 
lawyers unduly congest the courts at the expense of those who have 
cases that are too “financially unappealing” to attract attorneys.15 As 
such, the courts have been faced with a greater number of pro se 
litigants, which increase the burden on public resources of the courts as 
it takes more time to construe complaints and arguments that have been 
drafted by non-lawyers.16 
 The Article concludes Part I by stating that it is evident “abusive 
lawyering remains pervasive under the existing rules” and “it is not the 
procedural rules themselves that account for the litigation extremes and 
inefficiencies they encounter in court proceedings.”17 Judge Marrero 
finds it more likely that the “interaction of economic and professional 
forces, combined with lawyers’ own practice styles and the methods they 
 
 11 See generally id. at 1610–23. 
 12 Id. at 1616–18. 
 13 Id. at 1624. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 1624–25. 
 17 Id. at 1632. In 1983, in an attempt to curtail vexatious litigation, Rule 11 was introduced. 
Id. at 1630–31. However, this was seen as a double-edged sword where filings of Rule 11 
sanctions became commonplace and were themselves abusive. Id. at 1631. Citing to cases where 
judges evaluate excessive costs, Judge Marrero notes that when opposing counsel objects to 
prevailing parties’ application for fee reimbursement, judges reduce the fee award by 33.5% on 
average. Id. at 1631 n.89. 
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employ in applying the rules, . . . better explain the excess.”18 Judge 
Marrero points to “inherent inefficiencies, as well as disincentives for 
improvement, [which] are fundamentally embedded in the justice 
system,” as the unnamed culprit to excessive fees and litigation.19 
C.     How and Where Over-Litigation Exists: Practice Style and 
Motion Practice 
 After outlining why the structure of the legal market has generated 
vexatious litigation tactics in Part I, the second part of Judge Marrero’s 
Article discusses how two distinct forces—lawyers’ personalities and 
litigation strategies—drive litigation abuse. The Article also outlines 
proposed next steps or solutions to alleviate the stated problems. 
 The Article details litigation styles that perpetuate waste through 
hasty and overblown action, and notes that over-litigation more 
generally is caused by lawyers who “ignore or downplay a vital facet of 
their role in the legal system: the public dimension.”20 Lawyers’ 
abdication of their public duties, Judge Marrero suggests, taxes society 
by causing “inconvenience to witnesses and third parties; disruption of 
business operations and personal affairs;”21 and the imposition on 
courts of “ancillary disputes that counsel should not have escalated to 
the judge in the first place.”22 Ultimately, Judge Marrero identifies the 
largest offender in this cycle of waste as the “deep-rooted culture of 
widespread, routine inefficiencies and condoned extremes.”23 
 Judge Marrero offers a mini-antidote by suggesting a culture shift 
away from lawyers’ focus on personal gain and to a more client- and 
society-focused view of the profession. He adds that stronger economic 
sanctions for “excess and abuse” and more “disciplinary actions” should 
be deployed to help with this culture shift.24 Ultimately, he posits that 
the “nuclear option” should also be available to deploy against abuse: 
“shifting the obligation to pay counsel’s fees and costs to a client or 
attorney that a court formally finds has engaged in serious abuse of the 
rules through frivolous, dilatory, or disproportionately extreme 
litigation tactics.”25 
 Additionally, because hourly rates incentivize spending more time 
on cases, he comments, lawyers are likely to ignore, rather than address, 
problems caused by over-litigation. To combat willful blindness, Judge 
 
 18 Id. at 1632. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 1641. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 1642. 
 23 Id. at 1644. 
 24 Id. at 1645. 
 25 Id. 
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Marrero suggests conducting empirical studies to identify particularly 
cost-intensive areas of litigation that may be dispensed with altogether.26 
1.     Excessive and Deficient Pleadings 
 Judge Marrero begins his assessment of over-litigation with the 
problem of excessive and deficient pleadings. While the Federal Rules 
often allow for the claims made, he states, they are often unnecessary or 
misdirected. He highlights the problem of fishing expeditions in 
complaints that target harms and wrongdoers with little discretion or 
regard for merit.27 These complaints are frequently met with hiding or 
withholding of information instead of a good-faith production of 
relevant information. The dragnet complaint begets the massive 
collateral expense of jurisdictional fights, especially where many 
different entities are involved. Judge Marrero suggests avoiding these 
delays by including only the most well-founded claims in the pleadings 
and allowing other claims to be preserved by stipulated agreements or 
by withdrawal without prejudice.28 
 To further curtail excessive and deficient pleadings, Judge Marrero 
advocates for a rule that would discourage surprise court filings and 
reduce the likelihood of nonsensical or inadequate pleadings. He 
proposes that plaintiffs verify that they have contacted defendants in an 
effort to discuss the dispute before filing the complaint.  
[S]uch disclosure should describe: any notice they gave about the 
substance of their claims before resorting to litigation; the 
defendants’ response; and whether there is any action the defendants 
should take or information or documents they should produce prior 
to the parties’ appearance in court at the initial conference, that 
might induce the plaintiffs to resolve all or part of the lawsuit.29 
In this regime, Judge Marrero notes that “defendants should state 
whether there is any action plaintiffs should take or information or 
documents they should produce, that might persuade the defendants to 
drop all or parts of their responses or counterclaims.”30 The resulting 
complaint would either reach the court with certain issues resolved or 
highlight certain issues for resolution. 
 
 26 Id. at 1674. 
 27 Id. at 1648. 
 28 Id. at 1651. 
 29 Id. at 1675–76. 
 30 Id. 
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2.     Motions to Dismiss 
 Judge Marrero argues that defendants often respond to any 
complaint with a motion to dismiss out of habit. In his view, 
“defendants should . . . admit allegations in a complaint and furnish 
particulars upon request about uncontroversial and undisputable 
facts . . . [taking] such issues out of contention rather than prolong[ing] 
the conflict.”31 He acknowledges that “[r]egrettably, the most 
straightforward, speedy, and economical resolution of a dispute is not 
always what many litigants and counsel—plaintiffs’ and defendants’—
perceive as advancing their interests.”32 And that, as a result, defendants’ 
answers tend to be formalistic, “volunteering as little as possible.”33 
Judge Marrero states the model defendant would “disclose facts that in 
the exercise of candor and good faith they should readily admit.”34 He 
laments that the Federal Rules allow defendants to operate without 
requiring a discussion with the plaintiffs and with no prior 
communication with the court.35 
 Judge Marrero states that the motion to dismiss has a mixed rate of 
success, achieving complete victory in 25% to 30% of cases.36 He also 
notes that often these dismissals are not with prejudice and as such give 
life to new complaints, or worse, appeals. The Article also notes that 
procedural tidiness, such as motions to strike duplicative actions or 
specific allegations, contribute to delay while producing very little in the 
way of justice.37 
 Judge Marrero suggests instituting procedurally required plaintiff–
defendant interaction to curtail the problems of blanket motions to 
dismiss. Before filing a motion to dismiss, the defendant should “alert 
plaintiffs about the specific defects in the pleadings—whether 
procedural, jurisdictional, or substantive—that constitute the grounds” 
upon which the defendant will object.38 This would allow plaintiffs the 
chance to amend the complaint before the judge is required to decide 
the motion submitted by the defendant.39 
3.     Discovery 
 The next area of practice addressed is discovery. Judge Marrero 
 
 31 Id. at 1652. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 1653. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 1653–56. 
 38 Id. at 1677–78. 
 39 Id. 
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notes that lawyers struggle with two main issues: first, how much 
discovery is actually necessary for the case, and second, what amount of 
resources are justified for the desired end.40 Consuming anywhere from 
50% to 90% of the litigation cost, discovery is the area in which over-
litigation can be most significantly reduced.41 This is especially the case 
where a defendant’s potential liability is massive or unbound. 
 The Article notes that discovery can be used as a tool of abuse to 
impose large costs on opponents in order to compel settlement, to hold 
hearings where parties air animosity toward each other, and to over-
prepare as a means of hitting billable hours.42 The specific discovery 
tools employed in over-litigation are “demands for production of 
documents, depositions, written interrogatories, and admission of 
facts.”43 The efforts to create a fulsome record for trial, he argues, are 
almost always for show, however, as only 2% of these disputes ever 
utilize the depositions taken and documents produced for trial.44 
 In this area, Judge Marrero advocates for the judge to take both a 
more active and more informal role in management. In this informal 
role, the judge could advise the parties as to his view of the request and 
allow the parties to modify accordingly. Should parties continue on 
what the judge deems an inappropriate or wasteful course, the judge 
could employ sanction-type remedies available under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.45 
4.     Summary Judgment 
 At the end of discovery, another potentially wasteful practice 
emerges: motions for summary judgment. The Article notes that many 
summary judgment motions are filed prematurely or are entirely 
frivolous. These create needless delays in resolution and drain court 
resources. According to a study by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), 
these motions increase the cost of litigation from 22% to 24%46 and 
increase the length of litigation by anywhere from nine to fifteen 
months.47 Despite the time and mixed success of these motions, they are 
almost always on the litigation schedule, suggesting that most lawyers 
believe that there will be no genuine issues of material fact in their 
proceedings.48 The time and expense of these motions, Judge Marrero 
 
 40 Id. at 1656–59. 
 41 Id. at 1656. 
 42 Id. at 1658. 
 43 Id. at 1659. 
 44 Id. at 1660. 
 45 Id. at 1630 (noting that “judges may require practitioners who multiply judicial 
proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously to personally pay the excess attorneys’ fees and costs 
that adversaries incur by reason of such misconduct”). 
 46 Id. at 1665. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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notes, is magnified by the fact that judges frequently do not address 
them at all, or deny them in whole or in part—making a substantial 
amount of time and work relatively useless.49 
 Judge Marrero, viewing unfounded or premature motions for 
summary judgment as one of the largest problems facing our courts’ 
efficient administration of justice today, proposes a multi-tiered 
solution to the issue. He maintains that the litigants should not have the 
ability to file as a matter of right. Instead, he suggests that the parties 
should have to schedule a conference with the court to discuss the basis 
for the motion. Before granting leave for the conference, the court 
should request pre-conference letters, which set forth the legal and 
factual support for the prospective motion.50 
 If there are genuine issues, the judge should ask the parties to 
“proceed directly to a trial on an expedited schedule . . . [where] after 
the presentation of the plaintiff’s direct case, the court . . . can apply 
what amounts to a trial equivalent of summary judgment 
procedure . . . under Federal Rule 50.”51 In addition, judicial action 
could be utilized to discourage baseless summary judgment practice in 
two other ways. First, “[t]he court could deny a party’s request to 
schedule a pre-motion conference,” signaling that the judge sees the 
motion as inappropriate for this stage of litigation.52 Second, if a motion 
already has been filed and “presents novel, complicated questions, the 
judge could postpone ruling on all or parts of it and proceed to trial—
thereby effectively denying the motion without prejudice.”53 
5.     Disproportionate Litigation 
 Judge Marrero briefly concludes that where the damages listed in 
the complaint are modest compared to the cost of the action for both 
parties, the judge should refer the case to settlement with mediation 
professionals or a magistrate judge.54 
D.     Fee Shifting 
 The final Section of the Article suggests a move toward the English 
model of shifting the prevailing party’s costs to the losing party. While 
the idea may not be novel, new problems have arisen in areas such as 
discovery that fee shifting might be able to more effectively address. 
 
 49 Id. at 1667. 
 50 Id. at 1678–79. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1679. 
 53 Id. at 1679–80. 
 54 Id. at 1682. 
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Judge Marrero suggests that over-litigation now “derives not so much 
from deliberate misconduct by practitioners—practices that are already 
unlawful—but from less visible though more extensive and pivotal 
forces: counsel’s subterranean actions that governing rules do not 
explicitly proscribe.”55 He notes,  
In the modern age of digital communication, electronically stored 
information, commercial globalization, and Big Law, the problem as 
it really exists exceeds by many orders of magnitude the concerns 
over the types and incidence of offensive conduct that underlie the 
attorney fee shifting regimes now in place and that initially prompted 
their adoption.56  
The amount of data sought in discovery and the increasing billable hour 
quotas from Big Law have driven up the cost of litigation substantially, 
with the Federal Rules permitting most actions, and the public should 
no longer have to shoulder the burden of increasing court gridlock and 
unaffordable justice. 
 Judge Marrero finally posits that the “time has come for American 
legislatures and courts to accord even broader recognition to the English 
rule. At minimum . . . in connection with attorneys’ fees generated by 
the losers in connection with discovery disputes, as well as by motions 
that the presiding judge finds were needlessly, prematurely, or 
improvidently filed.”57 
II.     COMMENTARIES AND RESPONSES 
A.     Individual Judicial Practices 
 The Federal Rules contain within them provisions that can greatly 
alleviate the problems identified by Judge Marrero. Judges Preska, 
Buchwald, and Koeltl, for example, deal with pre-motion requirements 
by incorporating Local Civil Rule 37.2 into their individual rules.58 This 
rule requires counsel to request an informal conference with the court 
before making a discovery motion.59 The court must rule on the motion 
 
 55 Id. at 1686. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1691. 
 58 See Hon. Loretta A. Preska, Individual Practices of Judge Loretta A. Preska, S.D.N.Y. 
(May 1, 2017), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=judge_info&id=1398 
[https://perma.cc/8437-52C2]; Hon. Naomi Reice Buchwald, Individual Practices of Naomi 
Reice Buchwald, S.D.N.Y. (May 2017), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php
?db=judge_info&id=1406 [https://perma.cc/83TL-VL66]; Hon. John G. Koeltl, Individual 
Practices of Judge John G. Koeltl, S.D.N.Y. (Mar. 2018), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/
show.php?db=judge_info&id=1517 [https://perma.cc/FE9S-2MDD]. 
 59 BD. OF JUDGES OF THE E.D.N.Y. & THE S.D.N.Y., LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK 40 (2018), http://
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or find that the dispute cannot be resolved at the conference before 
counsel may proceed with the formal motion. On non-discovery 
matters, Judges Preska and Buchwald both require pre-motion 
conferences in civil cases, with certain exceptions.60 Judge Koeltl only 
requires such conferences “before making a motion to dismiss, motion 
to amend or a motion for summary judgment.”61 Judges Preska and 
Buchwald require the moving party to submit a three-page letter that 
includes “the basis for the anticipated motion.”62 The non-moving party 
has three days to send a three-page response. Judge Preska allows the 
moving party to submit a reply that is no longer than two pages within 
the next day.63 On initial pretrial conferences, Judge Koeltl makes it 
explicit that “[t]he parties are expected to confer with each other 
pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before the 
initial conference with the Court. The parties are expected to provide a 
Rule 26(f) report to the Court before the initial conference.”64 What is 
expected to occur at the conference is excerpted from Rule 26(f) in part 
below: 
In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and basis of their 
claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or 
resolving the case . . . . The attorneys of record and all unrepresented 
parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for 
arranging the conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the 
proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court within 14 
days after the conference a written report outlining the plan. The 
court may order the parties or attorneys to attend the conference in 
person.65 
These rules resemble practices that I have experienced in the field of 
arbitration, both as an advocate and neutral, throughout my career as a 
lawyer. They have been effective and efficient in moving matters along. 
 I am reminded of the commercial and civil matters in which I have 
been privileged to serve as an arbitrator, sometimes alone or as a 
member of a panel of three, and at times as a panel chair. In these 
matters, pursuant to ADR provider rules, counsel, and at times a client 
representative, appear at the pre-hearing conference where decisions are 
made by the arbitrator concerning documents, discovery requests, 
interrogatories, stipulations, motions, and other pre-hearing subjects 
(e.g., expert reports, briefs and memoranda, and the hearing schedule), 
to facilitate the arbitrable process with the goal of the arbitrator(s) 
 
www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X7R-2WBM] (Rule 37.2). 
 60 Preska, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)); Buchwald, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(B)). 
 61 Koeltl, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(B)). 
 62 Preska, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)); Buchwald, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(B)). 
 63 Preska, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)). 
 64 Koeltl, supra note 58, at 2 (Rule 2(A)). 
 65 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
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issuing a pre-hearing order, thus setting the framework for the 
arbitration. Motions are often discouraged at an early stage and, when 
and if made, if dispositive in nature, they are not infrequently taken 
under consideration until the end of the hearing. Document and 
discovery issues are relegated to the parties in the first instance to 
attempt resolution within a certain time period, with a process of 
resolution if differences remain after counsel confer with each other. At 
times, in my experience, counsel have been encouraged to consider 
settlement or mediation, a practice that now has become a routine part 
of the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) widely used and 
modeled Commercial Arbitration Rules, thereby removing the 
psychological fear of appearing weak by raising it unilaterally.66 
 I have found, both as an advocate and neutral, ADR processes to be 
efficient in the handling of the most difficult and complex of matters. 
ADR-trained neutrals, working under the rules and practices of ADR 
institutions, have made a significant contribution to the justice system 
of the country.67 Indeed, many of these neutrals are former judges and 
litigators now committed to an ADR practice. 
1.     Initial Discovery Protocols 
 At the request of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the FJC 
prepared the 2018 document Initial Discovery Protocols for the handling 
of Fair Labor Standards Act cases (not pleaded as collective actions), 
which offers a very useful template for civil justice cases. The FJC was 
inspired by protocols developed for employment cases that, upon 
implementation, led to less motion activity and a greater likelihood of 
 
 66 R-9. Mediation:  
In all cases where a claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, upon the AAA’s 
administration of the arbitration or at any time while the arbitration is pending, the 
parties shall mediate their dispute pursuant to the applicable provisions of the AAA’s 
Commercial Mediation Procedures, or as otherwise agreed by the parties. Absent an 
agreement of the parties to the contrary, the mediation shall take place concurrently 
with the arbitration and shall not serve to delay the arbitration proceedings. 
However, any party to an arbitration may unilaterally opt out of this rule upon 
notification to the AAA and the other parties to the arbitration. The parties shall 
confirm the completion of any mediation or any decision to opt out of this rule to the 
AAA. Unless agreed to by all parties and the mediator, the mediator shall not be 
appointed as an arbitrator to the case.  
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 14 
(2013, amended 2016), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DZV5-P4T3]. 
 67 See Commercial Arbitration Training for Arbitrators and Counsel, N.Y. STATE B. ASS’N 3, 
http://www.defenseassociationofnewyork.org/resources/Documents/NYSBA%20Commercial
%20Arbitration%20Training%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYC3-GLMT] (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2018). 
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settlement.68 The intent of the Initial Discovery Protocols was “to 
encourage the parties and their counsel to exchange information and 
documents early in the case, help frame the issues to be resolved, and 
plan for more efficient and targeted discovery.”69 Lawyers and judges 
participated in the development of the protocols.70 The FJC report states 
that  
[the] discovery is provided automatically by both sides within 30 
days of the defendant’s responsive pleading or motion. While the 
parties’ subsequent right to discovery . . . is not affected, the amount 
and type of information initially exchanged ought to focus the 
disputed issues, streamline the discovery process, and minimize 
opportunities for gamesmanship.71  
The FJC’s 2016 report noted “that judges have applied the Employment 
Protocols ‘more widely than one would expect given the parameters in 
the pilot materials . . . .’”72 The protocols give evidence of the ability of 
the judiciary and bar, working together, to effectively address injustices 
in the civil justice system. The accompanying Essay in this special issue 
of the Cardozo Law Review by John Kiernan, Esq. offers many 
constructive ideas as to general methods of improving efficiency, with 
courts playing a major role in spurring institutional cultural change. He 
identifies four main areas as ripe mechanisms for change by advocates 
and clients, and five in which courts can increase judicial efficiency and 
stem over-litigation.73 
2.     My Limited Survey 
 Beyond perspectives offered in this special issue of the Cardozo 
Law Review, a broad survey of the bar of New York is likely to yield 
other ideas as to improving the administration of justice. My own very 
limited survey of a few colleagues at the bar produced these comments: 
 
 68 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
CASES NOT PLEADED AS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 1 (2018), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/
materials/12/Initial_Discovery_Protocols_FLSA_Jan_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK9N-
G4KN]. 
 69 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 Id. at 2–3. 
 71 Id. at 2. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See generally John S. Kiernan, Reducing the Cost and Increasing the Efficiency of Resolving 
Commercial Disputes, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 187 (2018). Among the points he made that caught 
my attention are engagement by advocates and judges in seeking creative ways to resolve 
portions of a dispute early and to streamline discovery and other litigation processes; enlisting 
courts in preventing conduct by opposing counsel that will impose undue burden or delay; 
enforcing concepts of proportionality for the entire dispute, not just discovery, and thereby 
managing adaptation of the scale of permitted processes before a decision to the dispute’s scale; 
and effectively employing the power to urge parties to mediate or negotiate when settlement 
seems like a potentially promising route. Id. at 190–91. 
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(i) The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules, with a particular 
emphasis on proportionality, show promise in reining in some 
of the abuses cited in the Article by Judge Marrero. Many costs 
of discovery are attributed to reviewing data for privilege and 
work product purposes in order to avoid waiver. If a court 
enters an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502, this will 
eliminate many of those costs by providing that disclosure in 
discovery is not a waiver either in the instant proceeding or any 
other.74 
(ii) A colleague experienced in the handling of large cases noted that, 
since the Sedona Conference75 and as a result of discovery rule 
changes, there has been a far more cooperative discourse 
occurring in the discovery process than was the case ten years 
ago. He adds that innovations like predictive coding, with its 
reliance on party cooperation, are taking hold and will 
substantially limit the costs of searching electronic data for 
information. It is not unreasonable to think that discovery 
abuse, as described in Judge Marrero’s Article, may be going 
through a passing phase because of technological advances that 
will allow production to be made with an algorithm and a push 
of a button. 
(iii) As to motions to dismiss, court cases, including from the United 
States Supreme Court, have invited the best of lawyers to test an 
adversary’s complaint at the 12(b)(6)76 stage, leading to an 
increase in such motions.77 
(iv) As to summary judgment, the Supreme Court’s Trilogy78 in the 
1980s signaled to trial courts, according to a colleague, that they 
 
 74 Rule 502 establishes a presumption against subject matter waiver, resolves the issue of 
inadvertent disclosure, provides for confidentiality orders, and supports party agreements, 
among other issues. See Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (Introduction and Overview), FED. 
EVIDENCE REV., http://federalevidence.com/Resources502 [https://perma.cc/2JEZ-7TNF] (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2018). 
 75 See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COOPERATION 
PROCLAMATION (2008), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/Opening_Grossman_
Maura.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EXP-CS3E]. 
 76 Rule 12: 
Defenses and Objections: when and How Presented; Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses; Pretrial Hearing . . .  
(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must 
be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the 
following defenses by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted[.] 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 77 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2273 (2012); see also Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 78 The Trilogy is discussed in more detail in footnote one of the following report, excerpted 
here:  
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should be scrutinizing such motions more closely and granting 
them more freely. The colleague, however, adds that the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s 
requirement of Rule 56.1 statements79 creates an enormous cost 
for the parties. 
(v) Suggestions for meeting and conferring hold promise and should 
be encouraged. Thomas Moore, an eminent trial lawyer, recently 
opined that if counsel had more opportunity to speak with each 
other before making motions, the chances are enhanced that a 
lot of issues traditionally brought to court could be eliminated 
or truncated. Encouraging and requiring client presence in 
certain parts of the pretrial process may allow clients to learn 
more about what motions are frivolous and as such prevent 
lawyers from pursuing them. More client involvement might 
also help contain costs through a fuller understanding of 
effective advocacy. 
(vi) If a defendant is required to provide an advance critique on the 
plaintiff’s complaint, as suggested by Judge Marrero,80 a 
colleague noted that in order not to advantage unfairly the 
 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (clarifying the burden placed on the 
party moving for summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 
(1986) (holding that a motion for summary judgment must be measured against the 
standard of proof at trial, and making the standard of proof for summary judgment 
the equivalent of the standard for a directed verdict); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding that a plaintiff with an inherently 
implausible claim must support it with more persuasive evidence than would 
otherwise be necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment). A thorough 
consideration of federal summary judgment practice is found in EDWARD BRUNET & 
MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 
2006).  
JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE: 1975–2000 
2 n.1 (2007), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/TrSJPR07.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8MCA-UWTL].  
 79 Local Civil Rule 56.1, titled “Statements of Material Facts on Motion for Summary 
Judgment,” requires:  
(a) Upon any motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, there shall be annexed to the notice of motion a separate, 
short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to 
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. Failure to 
submit such a statement may constitute grounds for denial of the motion.  
(b) The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a 
correspondingly numbered paragraph responding to each numbered paragraph in 
the statement of the moving party, and if necessary, additional paragraphs containing 
a separate, short and concise statement of additional material facts as to which it is 
contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.  
BD. OF JUDGES OF THE E.D.N.Y. & THE S.D.N.Y., LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK, supra note 59, at 50 (Rule 
56.1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 80 See Marrero, supra note 1, at 1677. 
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plaintiff, the critique should be made without prejudice to later 
arguments by the defendant after the complaint is actually filed. 
(vii) Judge Marrero suggests that, where the actual amount in 
controversy is grossly disproportionate to the costs, the judge 
should promptly refer the matter to settlement.81 While such an 
option might work in certain types of cases, there is concern 
about closing the door of the court to plaintiffs who appear pro 
se, or by pro bono counsel, with small monetary claims that for 
these parties represent a matter of “life and death” in terms of 
human needs.82 Some colleagues point out that abusive 
consumer practices have been identified and eradicated because 
of small claims. 
(viii) As to Judge Marrero’s Article’s suggestion of a broader use by the 
courts of the English rule that the loser pays the winner’s 
attorney fees,83 this could have a negative effect on plaintiffs who 
are not wealthy, closing the door to many plaintiffs. Moreover, 
contingent fee lawyers would need to factor it in to their risk 
analysis, with the result that they might encounter a case they 
would want to take but decline to do so because of the risk of 
paying the defendant’s fees, which when added to everything 
else, outweighs the benefit. A colleague, familiar with 
international practice, is of the view that the effects of such 
shifting are often exaggerated in deterring litigation, as fees are 
usually limited to what are reasonable, set by a bar association, 
or limited to court costs only in some foreign jurisdictions.84 
(ix) In a recent conversation with the former federal judge, Barbara 
Jones, she said that she used effectively, as did other colleagues, 
practices such as those employed by Judges Preska, Buchwald, 
and Koeltl in their individual court rules. She added that it was 
helpful at times to call lawyers into chambers to talk to them 
about settlements and mediation because “lawyers cannot evade 
each other at conferences in front of a judge.” She also 
mentioned the opportunity present at such a conference to 
discourage motions that essentially were “silly.” In a much 
 
 81 Id. at 1682. 
 82 The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution provides:  
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rule 
of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also infra Conclusion. 
 83 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1684–90.  
 84 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 851 (2016). Delaware’s Supreme Court upheld a fee shifting bylaw for reasons of 
sound public policy, but the legislature subsequently banned the change due to the influences of 
the state bar, according to Bainbridge. Id. at 2, 19. 
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earlier conversation I had with the late Judge Milton Pollack, he 
shared with me his view of the importance of a judge setting an 
early trial date while providing the parties with a timeline for 
document exchanges, discovery, and if necessary, motions. His 
reputation for helping parties achieve settlements was 
outstanding. When inquiring of former federal judge Kevin 
Duffy of his strong reputation for achieving settlements, he 
mentioned a time period when he had an unusually large 
workload as a result of the illness of another federal judge and 
sent a number of those cases to Judge Pollack for handling. In 
other words, he said, he inherited Judge Pollack’s reputation!  
B.     An Overview 
 In the last three decades of the twentieth century, as criticisms 
escalated over the costs of civil litigation and the client–warrior 
adversarial approach to justice resolutions, the dawn of a new field was 
emerging as a possible remedy called alternative dispute resolution. 
While new to civil litigation, it was not new to lawyers like me who 
practiced in the field of labor law. As I pursued my career in the early 
1960s in civil litigation, and the whirlwind of motion practice in the 
lower courts of New York City, I became involved with firm clients, 
both labor and management, where major industries could be shut 
down. I was struck by the different ways disputes were handled. My first 
civil justice litigation experience involved assisting a firm partner in 
drafting a motion to separately state and number the causes of action 
present in a ninety-page complaint. I worked night and day researching 
that motion’s history and the available precedents, concluding that six 
causes of action were present, as the partner believed at the very 
beginning of the project. We spent many hours discussing the 
complaint and drafting the motion papers. I am sure the client was 
billed for this time. We lost the motion and in time the case was settled. 
Had there been a meet and confer approach before making a motion, we 
may well have never made that motion after a discussion by counsel 
with the judge. 
 Concurrently, I found myself involved in grievances and collective 
bargaining negotiations for employers and a printing union. As to 
grievances, multi-step resolution processes were prescribed by the 
collective bargaining agreements, and many such grievances were 
disposed of at the first stage through amicable resolution by the parties 
themselves; some were resolved at the second stage with the help of 
counsel; and fewer went to the final stage of arbitration. At every point 
we were forced to talk to each other and doing so made all the difference 
in the world. Our arbitrators were experienced and effective in assuring 
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a fair and timely hearing and conclusion to each matter. They were 
trained and served under ethical standards and good practice guidelines, 
not unlike the citizens of an ancient civilization who took an oath of 
office before undertaking service as an arbitrator.85 When our collective 
bargaining agreements ended and new ones had to be negotiated, 
federal, state, and sometimes private mediators were available for when 
impasses occurred. Sometimes the mediation effort was unsuccessful, 
and a work stoppage or strike occurred. However, we knew we had to 
“live” with each other and we worked bilaterally to solve such 
differences—and we did. The earnings from this practice area paled in 
financial significance to the revenue from civil justice litigation, but the 
firm was proud to have a labor and employment practice area to offer its 
general clients. 
 The applicability of the labor management dispute resolution 
structure led the late Frank E.A. Sander to opine in 1976 that the civil 
justice system would benefit enormously from offering parties in 
dispute other options for securing a fair, inexpensive, and timely 
resolution of their disputes,86 to which I now turn. 
C.     ADR as a Remedy and Solution 
 The field of ADR owes a large part of its ascendancy to the courts 
themselves and to the groundbreaking Pound Conference in 1976, the 
event that led to the birth of modern dispute resolution,87 and the 
thought-provoking speech of Professor Frank Sander. He advocated for 
the creation of a “multi-door courthouse” where a court official would 
examine the nature of each new dispute during intake and decide on the 
optimal dispute resolution process.88 He argued, in a published 1990 
debate, that “our mission is to help clients find the best way to handle 
their disputes,” asking “why shouldn’t it be part of our explicit 
professional obligation to canvass those options with clients? How 
 
 85 The oath of the citizens of Delphi provided:  
Every question in the judgement relating to the moneys and boundaries of Apollo I 
will decide as is true to the best of my belief, nor will I in any wise give false 
judgments for the sake of favour or friendship or enmity; and the sentence passed in 
accordance with the judgment I will enforce to the best of my power with all possible 
speed, and I will make just restoration to the god. 
MARCUS NIEBUHR TOD, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMONGST THE GREEKS 116 (1913). 
 86 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the National Conference 
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 
70 F.R.D. 79, 111–34 (1976). 
 87 Id. 
 88 In Memoriam: Frank E.A. Sander ’52, a Pioneer in the Field of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (1927–2018), HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 27, 2018), https://today.law.harvard.edu/
memoriam-frank-e-sander-52-pioneer-field-alternative-dispute-resolution-1927-2018 [https://
perma.cc/89ZH-XRXM]. 
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would we feel about a doctor who suggested surgery without exploring 
other possible choices?”89 
 Also empowering of the ADR option was the expansive application 
of the Federal Arbitration Act90 and the passage of federal statutes 
calling for the federal courts to develop cost and delay reduction plans 
including ADR.91 Even before some of these statutes, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit embraced the notion of an 
appellate court promoting settlements and it added staff to assist in that 
effort.92 Law schools followed suit, adding courses to educate students 
on ADR methods from negotiation to mediation to arbitration. In the 
1990s, with a vision of a broader system of civil justice resolutions, bar 
associations added sections and committees to educate and train 
practicing lawyers. ADR provider programs and organizations grew to 
assist in these developments, associating as they did so with bar 
associations and law schools. 
 The burden and costs of civil justice litigation in New York, as 
described by Judge Marrero, strongly suggest to me that there should be 
a greater use of ADR processes offered to parties as options. As noted in 
a recent program of the New York State Bar Association held at 
Fordham Law School, empirical evidence over the past ten years has 
shown the success of various mediation programs in pilot projects in 
New York State, as well as in states outside of New York and 
internationally.93 
1.     Federal Court Mediation Programs 
 By way of background, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1998 authorized federal courts to compel parties to participate in certain 
ADR processes, including mediation.94 Although federal district courts 
started designing and testing ADR procedures as early as the 1970s, the 
biggest growth in ADR came in response to the Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990 (CJRA), which, as amended, required the federal district courts 
to develop cost and delay reduction plans including the adoption of six 
case management principles, the sixth of which was alternative dispute 
 
 89 See Donna Shestowsky, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: An Empirical Study of Litigants’ 
Awareness of Court-Sponsored Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 189, 191 (2017). 
 90 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012) (originally enacted in 1925). 
 91 See 28 U.S.C. § 652 (2012). 
 92 See ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 23 (2d ed. 2006), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/MediCon2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJN-WCGU]. 
 93 See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, THE LITIGATIVE DNA—THE UNDERUTILIZATION OF 
MEDIATION IN NEW YORK AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2018), http://www.nysba.org/
LitigativeDnaCoursebook [https://perma.cc/3Y94-22C5]. 
 94 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2012). 
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resolution.95 Many of the ninety-four district courts developed ADR 
procedures in response to this statute. With regard to the federal courts 
generally, at least twenty-five districts—or a little more than a quarter of 
the courts—provide general authorization to use ADR, authorization for 
settlement conferences only, or authorization for both.96 
 The range of the various mediation programs—even simply among 
the various districts in New York—offers experiences from which to 
learn and upon which to build. Beginning in 2006, the Western District 
of New York became the first federal court in New York to establish 
automatic mediation programs as the initial default process to be 
followed in almost all civil cases (with “opt-out provisions”97 and 
exclusions for limited matters such as habeas corpus, extraordinary 
writs, bankruptcy, and social security appeals—cases that predominately 
implicate issues of public policy). The pilot was initially limited to the 
caseload of Judge William Skretny, who pioneered the program. The 
mediation program pilot in the Western District of New York has 
become a permanent part of the Court due to its success of resolving 
nearly 78% of the cases without court involvement.98 Eight years later, 
the Northern District adopted a similar mandatory program with strong 
settlement results as well.99 
 By contrast, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York have 
adopted hybrid mediation programs, with some types of cases 
constituting discretionary referrals and some automatic. The Southern 
District has been in the forefront, as previously mentioned, in creating 
mediation pilots with accompanying discovery protocols with each new 
pilot, in establishing mediator advisory panels, and in assessing 
 
 95 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471–482 (2012). The six principles that 
must be included in the plan are; (1) systemic, differential treatment of complex and simple 
cases; (2) early and ongoing control of the pretrial process by setting early firm trial dates, 
controlling the extent of discovery and deadlines for motion practice; (3) careful and deliberate 
monitoring of complex cases; (4) encouragement of cost-effective discovery and voluntary 
exchange of information; (5) conservation of judicial resources by prohibiting the consideration 
of discovery motions unless accompanied by certifications of good faith efforts; and (6) 
authorization to refer appropriate cases to available ADR programs. § 473. 
 96 DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN 
INITIAL REPORT 6 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ADR2011.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TC8Q-76K2]. 
 97 Barry Radin, ADR Program Coordinator for the Western District of New York, stated 
recently at The Litigative DNA program that motions for “opt-outs” are rarely granted. Barry 
Radin, Discussion at the N.Y. State Bar Association’s Program: The Litigative DNA—The 
Underutilization of Mediation in New York and What Can Be Done About It (May 9, 2018). 
 98 Gary Shaffer, Automatic Court Annexed Mediation in New York’s Federal District Courts: 
Sometimes Numbers Don’t Lie, N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. (N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n, New York, NY), 
Spring 2018, at 2, http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=82394 [https:// 
perma.cc/5E7G-89CC]. 
 99 See id. at 2–3; N.D.N.Y., GENERAL ORDER NO. 47: MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM 1 
(2018), www.nynd.uscourts.gov/sites/nynd/files/general-ordes/GO47.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SVS-VLTJ]; Mandatory Mediation Program Statistics, N.D.N.Y., http://
www.nynd.uscourts.gov/mandatory-mediation-program-statistics [https://perma.cc/WKD4-
EETU] (last visited Sept. 11, 2018). 
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mediators on its panels.100 The Eastern District has been in the forefront 
with the ADR processes of neutral evaluation and non-binding 
arbitration. What is particularly interesting about the statistics of both 
the Southern and Eastern Districts is how the number of cases handled 
through these programs have grown over the course of a relatively short 
time period.101 Other ADR initiatives by these District Courts have had 
similar positive results. Between 2009 and today, for example, super-
storm Sandy became the impetus for an insurance mediation program 
both at the Eastern District and at the AAA. Over 6,000 such claims 
were resolved by the AAA with a 65% settlement rate, and 69 claims 
were resolved in the Eastern District with a similar settlement rate.102 
Similarly, in 2009, the Southern District’s Bankruptcy Court began a 
“Loss Mitigation” mediation program, which achieved loan 
modifications in 56% of the matters that were mediated.103 The success 
of these mass disaster programs need not be so limited. With 98% of 
civil cases eventually settling,104 are more pilots not warranted to 
address the problems identified by Judge Marrero? 
2.     New York State Courts 
 One of the great successes with ADR and problem-solving at the 
state level is to be found in the community dispute resolution programs 
of the New York State Unified Court System (NYSUCS). The NYSUCS 
offers parties access to free or reduced-fee mediation in family law, 
general civil, and commercial law disputes, with services available in 
almost all the New York State counties.105 Any New Yorker, regardless 
of whether they have a case pending in court, may use services offered 
by the Community Dispute Resolution Centers (CDRCs) Program in 
 
 100 For a discussion of the evolution of the Southern District mediation program, see 
generally Rebecca Price, An Alternative Approach to Justice: The Past, Present, and Future of the 
Mediation Program at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 6 Y.B. ARB. 
& MEDIATION 170 (2014). 
 101 For example, annual reports show that in the Eastern District (which is only automatic 
for FLSA cases) there was a 38% increase in discretionary referrals. See E.D.N.Y., ALTERNATIVE 
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 102 Statistics from the AAA were supplied by Jeffrey Zaino, Vice President of AAA. Statistics 
from the Eastern District available through the Court’s website. E.D.N.Y., ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION REPORT: JULY 1, 2015–JUNE 30, 2016 3–4 (2016), https://
img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/2015-2016mediationreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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 103 See Daniel Gill, Bankruptcy Court’s Mortgage Mediation Program a Success, BANKR. ON 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.bna.com/bankruptcy-courts-mortgage-
n57982084348 [https://perma.cc/L2PQ-8DEU]. 
 104 See Marrero, supra note 1, at 1659–60, 1660 n.122. 
 105 N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTERS PROGRAM, 
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their local area. Over one thousand professionally trained mediators 
volunteer their services for matters referred for arbitration and 
mediation including consumer–merchant disputes, matrimonial 
property division issues, and automobile Lemon Law cases.106 
 As to the State’s commercial courts, a piloted program in 2014 was 
established for a two-year period whereby, each week, every fifth 
Commercial Division case in which a Request for Judicial Intervention 
(RJI) was filed was referred to a Mandatory Mediation Pilot Project, 
which for a variety of reasons was not as successful as was initially 
anticipated.107 Another pilot was begun in 2017 to cure issues 
encountered in the prior pilot project. The cases in this new Non-
Division Pilot Project are newly filed commercial cases (excluding pro 
se matters) assigned to a justice outside the Division, and in which the 
filer of the RJI designated the matter as a “Contract” case and sought a 
preliminary conference.108 In adopting this mandatory mediation pilot 
project, the task force indicated that it was inspired by the positive track 
records of courts that had already required parties to mediate, noting 
similar programs were piloted in Florida, Texas, California, and New 
Jersey.109 The earlier pilot, which failed to meet expectations, at least 
provided parameters for a new pilot, which will likely meet with better 
success. Pilots have also been initiated in Surrogates Court in New York 
county110 and in Westchester county.111 Each pilot experience provides a 
guide as to how to improve ways to increase utilization of mediation in 
 
 106 “During 2016, CDRCs served 67,118 people in 27,012 total cases. . . . Family matters, 
including child custody, visitation and support, accounted for 24 percent of these 
cases. . . . Cases mediated through the Collaborative Family Law Center have a 91 percent 
success rate[.]” N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 11–12 (2017), http://
ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-05/16_UCS-Annual_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8S2J-BMVY]. 
 107 See Memorandum from Chris Stern Hyman to Panel Members participating in the 
March 22, 2018 Conference on Underutilization of Mediation in the Courts (Feb. 1, 2018), 
http://www.nysba.org/DnaHyman [https://perma.cc/X8MS-JM9E]; CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK FORCE 
ON COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF 
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 25–28 (2012), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/
pdfs/chiefjudgestaskforceoncommerciallitigationinthe21stpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YHU-
XK25]. 
 108 See New York County—Manhattan: ADR Overview, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://
www.nycourts.gov/courts/ComDiv/NY/ADR_overview.shtml [https://perma.cc/XL9T-KWW3] 
(last updated May 24, 2018) (subsection “Mandatory Mediation Pilot Project for Certain 
Commercial Cases Outside the Commercial Division”). 
 109 See generally John D. Feerick & Linda Gerstel, The Underutilization of Mediation in New 
York and What Should Be Done About It?, 11 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. (N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n, New 
York, NY), Fall 2018, at 23–32. 
 110 See ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMM. OF THE N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, REVIEW OF THE 
NEW YORK COUNTY SURROGATE’S COURT PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM (2016), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/20073100-Surrogate_Project_Report_ALTDIS_
10.3.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/N75G-NFUT]. 
 111 See Hon. Alan D. Scheinkman, Rules of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 
COM. DIVISION SUP. CT. ST. N.Y., COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER (Aug. 2011), https://www.
nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/PDFs/9th-ADR-Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LWD-Y2CD]. 
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New York. As recently as April 20, 2018, Chief Judge Janet DiFiore and 
Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence Marks announced a plan to 
revitalize the court system’s commitment to ADR by building upon the 
courts’ existing statewide programs and promoting the goals of the 
Chief Judge’s Excellence Initiative to enhance the quality of justice.112 
An Advisory Committee has been formed, which is expected to consider 
the expansion of ADR programs in the Supreme Court, lower civil 
courts, Family Court, and Surrogates Courts, especially in the field of 
mediation.113 
 Infrastructure systems already in place provide quality assurance 
that future expansion in court programs will be professionally handled 
by educated and neutral mediators. The New York State ADR office 
promotes quality assurance through the approval of mediation courses 
pursuant to Part 146 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge.114 A 
comparable mediation committee exists in the Southern District and a 
similar committee was recently established in the Eastern District.115 
Court rosters have grown dramatically and there are also a wealth of 
mediation educational courses.116 
 In my view, mediation provides for a more complete rendering of 
justice in a great many situations. In the world of disputes, people seek 
less trauma, less expense, less delay, greater simplicity, fewer public 
embarrassments, and more options for securing a fair and just outcome. 
Mediation also offers solutions not otherwise obtainable in court 
litigation, as it allows for a greater consideration of the interests of the 
parties.117 Two of our greatest presidents, who expressed the values of 
our founding nation, embraced ADR: Washington employed a multi-
step process for resolving disputes under his will, starting with an effort 
to achieve an amicable outcome and ending with arbitration;118 Lincoln, 
a courtroom lawyer by profession, weighed in heavily on compromise as 
a problem solving tool, noting that the nominal winner in a litigation is 
often the real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time.119 A century 
later, United States Chief Justice Warren Burger waded in with his view 
 
 112 See Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., New ADR Initiative Aims to Reduce Case 
Delays and Enhance Access to Justice 1 (Apr. 20, 2018), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/
files/document/files/2018-05/PR18_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3XQ-YVSC]. 
 113 Id. at 2–3. 
 114 ADR Neutrals & Mediation Trainers / Part 146, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/adr/Part146.shtml [https://perma.cc/H944-FWUT] (last visited Sept. 11, 
2018). 
 115 See Feerick & Gerstel, supra note 109. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991). 
 118 See THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON AND SCHEDULE OF HIS 
PROPERTY, TO WHICH IS APPENDED THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF MARTHA 
WASHINGTON 28 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., The Mount Vernon Ladies’ Ass’n of the Union 
1939). 
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that “[o]ur system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too 
inefficient for a truly civilized people.”120 Founder of the CPR Institute 
for Dispute Resolution James F. Henry agrees: “To be equitable and just, 
our civil system of resolving disputes—formal and informal—has to 
offer affordable options for parties of limited means.”121 
D.     Collaborations and Education 
 Over the past two decades, law schools in New York and elsewhere 
have demonstrated their capacity to be partners in the societal mission 
of providing access to justice to all through curricular offerings in 
clinical legal education and pro bono and volunteer activities of their 
students, faculty, and graduates. Law students, working in clinical 
programs under experienced faculty supervision and pursuant to court 
rules, have provided invaluable assistance in our civil justice system to 
many individuals unable to afford legal assistance. This outreach has 
extended to service by students, educated and trained in the field of 
mediation, as neutrals in the state courts of New York and in 
community resolution centers under the auspices of the NYSUCS. 
Students of many New York law schools participate in these programs, 
with Fordham University School of Law as a pioneer in the Small 
Claims Part of the Civil Court122 and the Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law as a pioneer with community centers.123 Indeed, federal courts in 
New York have availed themselves of this resource in unique ways, as 
exemplified by the development by former Chief Judge Loretta Preska of 
a collaboration with New Jersey’s Seton Hall Law School in providing 
representation to pro se parties in settlement mediations. According to 
the Seton Hall director of that program, David White, over the history 
of that program, 150 Seton Hall students have assisted 300 clients in 
mediation advocacy with a 68% success rate.124 Students and faculty of 
other law schools as well have provided important assistance to the 
federal courts in New York in dealing with civil justice matters. Further 
harnessing of this resource, I suggest, could help immeasurably with the 
challenges described by Judge Marrero. This might be a good subject for 
a future Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for 
 
 120 Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A.J. 62, 66 (1984). 
 121 James F. Henry, Lawyers as Agents of Change, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 49, 
50 (2001). 
 122 Mediation, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23932/mediation 
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 123 See Mediation Clinic, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. L., https://cardozo.yu.edu/clinics-
professional-skills/clinics/mediation-clinic?action [https://perma.cc/Y3UF-AKUZ] (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2018). 
 124 Email from David Michael White, Dir., Seton Hall Univ. Sch. Law Conflict Mgmt. 
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the Second Circuit. 
 The Bar Associations of New York are additional enormous 
resources for the courts in addressing the civil justice challenges at hand. 
They are mission-oriented to serve the needs of their members, and, at 
the same time, they are committed to the honor and dignity of the legal 
profession. These associations need to partner with the courts to address 
the excesses and abuses that Judge Marrero illuminates. Indeed, the 
courts require the assistance of the bar in assessing and considering the 
fairness of the justice system. A useful model that might be followed 
involves an initiative by the late Robert MacCrate.125 Concerned by the 
lack of collaborations between the practicing bar and the academic bar, 
he created a national conference that led to an unprecedented gathering 
and dialogue by bar presidents and law school deans and professors to 
foster greater understanding of the respective work of the practicing and 
academic communities.126 One byproduct of this conference was 
increased involvement of law professors in the work of the organized 
bar and of practicing lawyers in the work of the academy. 
 Ethics education of students and lawyers is another remedy of 
importance. The crisis of Watergate led to the creation of legal ethics as 
a required course in ABA-approved law schools.127 Part of the hope was 
that such courses would help develop professional character, prompting 
the late Justice Tom Clark to remark: “[o]ur law schools, it seems to me, 
must shoulder the burden of ‘teaching’ honesty because there is simply 
no one else to do the job.”128 The teachers of legal ethics have done a 
 
 125 MacCrate spearheaded the MacCrate Report, the 1992 report of the ABA Task Force on 
Law School and the Profession, which called for practical skills training during and after law 
school.  
The publication of the MacCrate Report set off a wide-ranging discussion among 
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associations, representatives of local law schools, and the judiciary, to discuss means 
to improve the state’s legal educational continuum; meetings, in various law schools, 
of special faculty committees and sometimes the entire faculty to discuss reforms of 
the curriculum; law school conferences to discuss the Report; and numerous law 
review articles discussing the Report and/or issues identified by the Report. 
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very good job of developing course materials and an active community 
of educators and scholars. As noted by Professor Bruce Green, the 
recipient of the 2018 ABA ethics medal, “scholars in the field look, for 
example, to history and philosophy, they conduct empirical research, 
and they draw on teachings of psychology, sociology, economics, and 
neuroscience, among others.”129 He cautioned that “it is unrealistic to 
think that we will inoculate our students against ethical impropriety.”130 
What we can do, he said, is to help students “think deeply about what it 
means to be a legal professional and what kind of professional they want 
to be.”131 Ethics courses have a unique mission, he added, including 
“teaching rules, teaching students to identify and resolve ethics 
problems, and inculcating professional values.”132 
 The late Mary Daly, another recipient of the Michael Franck ABA 
award and a role model for Professor Green, agreed with Professor 
Green on the importance of including the learning from other 
disciplines. By lifting the education of law students, said Daly, “it 
enables us to better know who we are, and to be ourselves as best we can 
be.”133 She added: “[H]olding on to who you are and being yourself at all 
times as best as you can . . . strikes me as being at the heart of 
integrity.”134 Daly said that the subject of integrity must be “exercised 
within a community” and treated as an institutional and personal 
virtue.135 It involves, she said, looking beyond one’s self, beyond one’s 
community, and beyond one’s institution. As to other disciplines she 
said:  
[O]rganizational and management theory can greatly contribute to 
our understanding of how integrity is exercised in a corporate or law 
firm setting. Behavioral theory can shed much light on why some 
lawyers who genuinely perceive themselves as persons of integrity are 
unaware of the wrongdoing around them. Cognitive science can 
show how human beings are hard-wired to respond differently to 
certain types of moral dilemmas.136 
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CONCLUSION 
 As modern day civil litigation, as described by Judge Marrero, 
places enormous burdens on courts and judges, it diminishes the 
resources available to deal with the rising tide of pro se litigants who are 
entitled to the equal justice promised to all as an American ideal. 
Notwithstanding the growth of volunteering by lawyers in areas of legal 
services involving the poor and low-income earners, Bruce Green, in 
accepting the ABA award, stated the reality that “there will never be 
enough lawyers for most of the people who need them” and “self-help 
materials will never adequately substitute for lawyers.”137 He asks 
whether there “isn’t [a] better strategy to change the legal system so that 
it does not depend so heavily on lawyers[.] In a profession of over one 
million lawyers, whose professional associations are dedicated to civil 
justice reform, are there not the resources and imagination to come up 
with alternatives?”138 
 The bar of this country, populated with 1.4 million lawyers, active, 
registered, and retired, can make a dent in some of these statistics 
through increased volunteering and participation in programs of bar 
associations, courts, government departments, and law schools, and in 
activities of legal aid organizations and community groups. Consider 
the impact if every lawyer handled one matter for those disadvantaged 
and vulnerable. In addressing the problems of Big Law, to use Judge 
Marrero’s words, a balance must be struck to make sure that low-
income earners and the poor are not left behind in the quest for justice. 
 In conclusion, if I were prescribing a required reading for anyone 
journeying through my “commentaries and responses,” it would be Into 
the 21st Century: Thought Pieces on Lawyering, Problem Solving, and 
ADR. It was published by the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution in 
2001.139 It begins with an informative piece on ADR in history by the 
late federal judge, Charles B. Renfrew and concludes with a reflective 
piece by P. Elpidio Villarreal, entitled, ADR: The Stream Becomes a 
Flood. All told, this sixty-nine-page book contains twenty-one essays by 
practitioners, commentators, teachers, judges, and public officials. It 
makes a compelling case for the adoption of ADR at all levels of the 
justice system. It deserves a wide reading at this time of crisis in areas of 
civil justice and of calls for major reforms in our civil justice system. 
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